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INTRODUCTION
North American grain and livestock subsectors are becoming more integrated
as barriers  to trade are eliminated under the North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA)  and  the  World  Trade  Organization  (WTO).  Increased  trade  creates  a
demand for further  economic harmonization  and focuses  attention on the obstacles
that remain. Transportation stands out as one of these anomalies. Customs and immi-
gration legislation,  and regulatory  regimes  of each country  continue  to impede  the
transportation  of agricultural products.
Cross-border  transportation  services  for grain  and livestock  operate  in sepa-
rate  markets.  Live  animals and  livestock products  are carried  almost exclusively by
truck transport in specialized  trailers that do not generally carry grain.  Refrigerated
meat products form  the largest value  and most geographically  dispersed volume of
NAFTA livestock  product trade. Live  cattle and  hogs are trucked  across borders  for
slaughter,  as  replacements  in  feeder  operations,  and  for  breeding  purposes.  Live
animal moves are more concentrated  geographically and volumes vary significantly
over time. Truck movements of livestock are generally unobstructed  except by health
inspection and safety regulations.
The transportation of grain among the NAFTA countries  is less integrated than
the  trade  of livestock  and  meat  products.  Truck,  rail  and  marine  carriers  compete
intensely  for  domestic  grain  movements,  but  Canadian  and  U.S.  carriers  only
compete indirectly in the origination  of grain shipments for third countries. The lack
of  transborder  competition  for  grain  transport  is  a  result  of differing  agricultural
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This  paper  examines  the  status  of  agricultural  transportation  among  the
NAFTA  countries,  and  provides  an outlook  on future  developments.  The  analysis
begins with an overview of the macro changes affecting transportation in the NAFTA
countries.  This  includes  such issues  as privatization/mergers,  deregulation and the
cancellation  of subsidy programs.  Subsequently, the focus turns to commodity move-
ments and progress made  to integrate and harmonize grain and livestock trade. The
impact of remaining  regulations  and  policy  differences  are highlighted.  The  paper
concludes with thoughts on transportation and economic harmonization  of the grain
and livestock sectors.
MACROECONOMIC  SETTING
Institutional  barriers make it difficult for the transport sector to orient its tradi-
tional  east/west  operations  to  the  new  north/south  trade  flows.  Transportation
services were not included in the Canada-U.S.  Trade Agreement (CUSTA,  1988).  The
U.S. government  cited national security reasons to exclude its marine sector from the
negotiations.  The Canadian  government demanded an "all-or-nothing"  treatment of
the transportation  sector. At the time, the  exclusion of the transportation  sector was
considered offset  by the economic  deregulation  of the domestic transport industries
that was occurring simultaneously
Extension of CUSTA to include Mexico  (NAFTA, 1994)  did little to create freer
trade  for  transport  services.  In  the  main,  NAFTA  served  only  to  bring  Mexican
treatment  of  cross-border  transportation  to  the  equivalent  procedures  practiced
between  the  United  States  and  Canada.  A schedule  was  developed  that permitted
reciprocal  entry  of trucking  to the  border states,  and subsequently to all states  after
seven  years.  In addition,  the  Land Transportation  Standards  Subcommittee  (LTSS)
was  established  to  pursue  more compatible  standards  and regulations  for rail  and
highway transportation within the NAFTA partnership.
The overall objective of LTSS is the elimination  of barriers  in trade and facili-
tation of cross-border  movement of goods and services. Under the umbrella of LTSS,
specialized working groups were formed to review the state of standards and regula-
tions  in  a range  of  areas,  including  driver  and  vehicle  licensing,  vehicle  manufac-
turing standards, transportation  of dangerous  goods and safety. The LTSS has agreed
to:  a legal age for operating a vehicle  in international  commerce;  a common log book
for hours of service;  bi-national  agreements on medical standards; steps toward har-
monized  regulations  on  hazardous  materials  transportation;  and  a  comparison  of
vehicle  weights  and  dimensions.  Notwithstanding  these  advances,  land  transport
between  Mexico and its NAFTA partners has yet to live  up to either the letter,  or the
spirit of the accord. By now Mexican  trucks should have free access to all U.S. border
states,  but technical  barriers (e.g.,  licencing)  continue to block their passage.
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The U.S. Intermodal Surface Efficiency  Act of 1991  (ISTEA) set aside funds to
establish  north/south  trade  corridor  routes.  Several  proposed  routes  have  been
named high priority highways  under the National Highway System Designation Act of
1995.  Reauthorization  of  the  ISTEA  legislation  under  TEA-21  is  expected  to  yield
"Intelligent  Highways"  technology  and  infrastructure  improvements  for  border
gateways.
Canadian  and  Mexican  governments  have  pursued  transportation  policies
that  complemented  the  competitive  U.S.  industry.  Since  1995,  the  Canadian
government  has  privatized  the Canadian  National  Railway,  liberalized  rail  regula-
tions  (Canada Transportation Act),  and eliminated  the  $600  million annual  transpor-
tation  subsidy for grain  movements  under the  former  Western Grain Transportation
Act (WGTA).  Further Bill C-4, an act to amend the  Canada  Wheat Board Act, could have
implications for transportation.
After  more  than  70  years  of  government  ownership,  the  Ferrocarriles
Nacionales  de  Mexico  (FNM)  was divided  into concessions  that  are  being sold.  In
1997,  the  Laredo-Mexico  City  rail link,  known  as the Northeastern  rail  concession,
was purchased in a joint venture between the Kansas City Southern and TMM, which
is the largest marine transportation company in Mexico.
The Class I railways have responded  to the new environment of NAFTA with
mergers that provided north/south linkages.  CN has announced  plans to merge with
the Illinois Central that will expand its reach to six key ports and make the CN-IC the
fifth largest railway of NAFTA. The CN-IC can provide single line services that avoid
switching costs and delays between  most major  points in Midwest U.S. markets  and
Canada. In April  1998, the CN-IC announced  a marketing agreement with the Kansas
City Southern Railroad that enables single line movement from Canada to Mexico.
The  U.S.  railways  have  undertaken  mergers  to  expand  their  north/south
networks. The Burlington  Northern-Santa Fe merger and the Union Pacific-Southern
Pacific mergers have created giant railways that span the entire United States west of
the Mississippi River. Although the railways have experienced some  "indigestion"  in
these mergers,  such as the recent embargo of the UP-SP at Laredo, the network eco-
nomies  should  ultimately  give  shippers  improved  rates  and  service.  The  Mexican
border  embargo  also  points  out the  problem  of capacity  constraints  at key  trans-
shipment points that limit traffic growth,  at least in the short-run.
The transport sector is challenged to serve a rapidly evolving agricultural cus-
tomer and to address the technological changes that are revolutionizing global trade.
Genetic  engineering  is providing a plethora of grain varieties  and promises  to give
processors the  ability to tailor their inputs precisely.  As more  buyers seek  "Identity
Preserved  Grains,"  the bulk handling  system  is confronted  with the  threat of more
congestion. The  rapid growth of intermodal rail service  may relieve the pressure on
the bulk handling system for specialty  grains. Containers also offer opportunities to
ship  grain  over  transborder  routes  where  institutional  barriers  preclude  bulk
movements.
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Producers  have  been  reacting  to  changing  grain  transportation  costs  and
falling price supports. Greater investment in the red meat industry has been matched
with record exports  of pork and  beef.  North American  farmers  are becoming  more
interested  in  the  development  of  value-added  processing.  The  desire  to  improve
value-added  content  has  lead  to  an  explosion  of  "new  age"  cooperatives  in  the
northern United  States  and  similar  investment in food processing on the  Canadian
prairies. As a result, the trucking industry has now displaced rail in the movement of
U.S.  grain  (Milling  & Baking  News,  1998).  No doubt,  this trend will lead  to greater
demand for cross-border trucking  of grain, too.
REGULATORY  BARRIERS TO TRADE
Barriers  to  agricultural  trade  posed  by  transportation  comprise  "natural"
obstacles and "man-made" hindrances. Natural obstacles are the logistical costs asso-
ciated with the equipment,  labour and fuel  necessary  to move  goods from origin  to
destination.  Man-made  hindrances  are  the  government  programs  and  regulations
that limit the ownership and operation  of foreign vehicles,  or discriminate  in favour
of  domestic  carriers.  Despite  NAFTA,  each  country  continues  to  operate  under
differing  regulatory  regimes  that have evolved  through  domestic  pressures.  Salient
features of regulatory barriers  are described  below and subsequently,  implications of
these differences  are discussed.
Motor Vehicle Weights and  Dimensions  Regulations
Incompatible  vehicle-weight  limits  are  the  most  important  impediments  to
north/south  long-haul trucking. Weight limit regulations  vary by province and state
along  all  routes  between  Canada  and  Mexico.  Iowa  and  Missouri  have  the  most
restrictive  regulations,  at  36,387  kilograms  (kgs)  maximum  gross  vehicle  weight
(GVW)  for  tractor  semi-trailer  configurations.  Mexico  has  the  most  liberal  weight
limits  (48,500  kgs),  but where  no effective  enforcement  exists observed  weights  are
much higher. Western Canada is the next most liberal truck weight limit at 46,560 kgs
GVW.  A  list  of north/south  weight  regulations  is  presented  in  Table  1 for  the
Mid-Continent  International  Trade  Corridor  (MITC)  that  follows  the  I-29/I-35
highway route from Winnipeg  to Mexico  City.
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Table  1:  Mid-Continent International  Trade Corridor Volatile Weights  and
Configurations
Weight Limits  Configurations
Highway Routing  Tractor  Double  Rocky  Combo
Semi-Trucks  Trailer  Mountain  e  Trailer
(KGS)  (KGS)  Double  oue  Triple
75  Manitoba  46,560  62,500  X  X  X
1-29 North  Dakota  36,287  47855  X  X  X
1-29 South  Dakota  36,287  56,700  X  X  X
1-26 Iowa  36,287
1-29/1-35  Missouri  36,287
1-35 Kansas  38,783  38,783  X  X
1-35 Oklahoma  40,824  40,824  X  X
1-35 Texas  36,287
85  Mexico  48,500  66,500  X  X
54 Mexico  48,500  66,500  X  X
Source:  Compiled by Authors.
Besides differences in weight limits, the various jurisdictions may have incom-
patible regulations  regarding  truck configurations.  Usually,  the northern  U.S. states
permit  heavier  vehicles,  while  the  southern  U.S.  states  allow higher  cube  trailers.
Very heavy  trucks are permitted  in Western  Canada, but lighter  U.S. trucks may not
necessarily  enter. Though  these trucks  may meet all the  height, weight,  and  length
regulations, depending  on where the axles are positioned, or whether they have a lift
axle,  U.S.  trucks  may  be prohibited  (or be required  to purchase  a "special  permit")
(Prentice, 1997).
Differences in truck weights and dimensions  pose a great problem for coordi-
nating movements.  For example  three jurisdictions do not permit double trailer com-
binations.  Canadian  carriers  who serve  the transborder  market must have  separate
fleets of trucks that meet the 80,000 pounds, eighteen wheel, standard vehicle for U.S.
movements.  Mexican  carriers face other barriers including  a debate over equipment
safety standards  and driver qualifications.  Shippers bear a higher  cost of underutili-
zation than would exist if vehicle regulations were uniform at a higher gross vehicle
weight.
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Cabotage  Restrictions
The right to operate  foreign owned vehicles  in a domestic market is known as
cabotage.  Customs  regulations  and immigration  rules  limit the  freedoms  of foreign
transportation  companies.  Often  these  regulations  are  poorly  understood  by  the
carriers,  and are inconsistently enforced.  These rules can add to operational costs and
getting  caught breaking the  rules can incur  a  $5,000 penalty for a first offence.  As a
result,  most carriers  do not attempt to  compete  for loads that involve  solely foreign
origins  and  destinations.  The  motor  carriers  are  plagued  with empty  moves  when
foreign  freight could  be carried.  The  railways are less  affected  by cabotage,  but are
not immune.  Crews, and  at times locomotives,  are forced  to  change at border  loca-
tions that may be inconvenient and costly.
U.S.  and Canadian  customs and immigration  policies for transport  have had
significant  differences.  For the motor carrier  industry,  Canadian  customs  rules per-
mitted  empty  trailers  to  be  repositioned  by  any  driver  after  a  full  trailer  was
delivered.  U.S.  rules required  that same drivers reposition the empty trailer who had
originally  delivered  it. Other  differences  exist  in the pickup  of an incidental load as
part of an international  movement.  Canadian  rules generally  allow  more flexibility
for foreign carriers than the U.S. regulations.
After  three  years  of  discussions,  the  U.S.  Customs  Service  has  recently
changed  its interpretation  of cabotage.  Previously,  Customs  looked at the transpor-
tation routes  involved  to  determine  whether  a movement was international  in  cha-
racter,  or an illegal domestic  "point-to-point"  violation. As of December 1, 1997, U.S.
Customs  revoked  prior interpretations  and  now  consider  the  nature  of  the  mer-
chandise carried  to decide whether the shipment is international  or not.
Access  to  international  merchandise  does  not  create  an  opportunity  for
Canadian truckers to carry other U.S. domestic merchandise.  The entire load must be
international to be legal in the United States.  Customs has clarified  its rule regarding
the  transfer  of empty  trailers.  The  new  ruling  allows  switching  of empty  trailers
between points in the United States.
According  to  the  new  rules,  Canadian-based  equipment  can  be  used  to
transport goods between  U.S.  points if the goods  are international-that  is, the load
either  originated  from  or  is  destined  for  a  point  outside  the  U.S.  Previously,
Canadians  were  not  permitted  to  pick  up  Mexican  goods  on  the  U.S.  side  of the
border  destined  for,  say,  Chicago.  Although  the  U.S.  Customs'  interpretation  has
changed,  U.S.  Immigration  has not made  the appropriate corresponding  changes to
regulations affecting Canadian drivers. The use of Canadian-based  equipment would
be lawful under the new U.S.  Customs interpretation  of cabotage,  but the use of the
driver  to  make  the  same  movement  would  be  illegal  under  Immigration  laws
(Smyrlis  and  Smith,  1998).  Informal  assurances  have  been given  that the  two  U.S.
agencies would  enforce  the regulations  the same way, but  no formal announcement
from U.S. Immigration has been made,  and none  is expected.
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Despite  Canadian  and  U.S.  success  in  harmonizing  Customs  regulations,
Immigration  rules  may be  getting  more  divergent.  In  1996,  the  Illegal Immigration
Reform  and Immigrant Responsibility Act  (IIRIR)  was  passed  by  the  U.S.  Congress.
Section  110  of  IIRIR  would  require  documentation  of  the  entry  and  departure  of
every  alien  crossing  the  U.S.  borders.  Implementation  of  visa  requirements  for
Canadians  has  been  delayed,  but not  abandoned.  Concern  exists  that Section  110
would create delays  in trade that adds  to inventory,  processing and freight  costs. At
busy  border  crossings,  like  Windsor-Detroit,  considerable  investments  would  be
required to accommodate  expanded  facilities  and automate  processes to achieve  the
current flow of traffic.
RAIL REGULATIONS  ON  RATES AND  SERVICE
Both Canada and the  United  States  are experiencing  the effects  of regulatory
changes  in the  rail  sector,  albeit  the  dynamics  differ.  These  effects  are  particularly
important in the grains sector in which rail plays an important role in shipping.  The
process of deregulation  in the United States  began in the early  1980s, whereas in the
Canadian grain sector  it is really just beginning. The major features  of the regulatory
system in  each country are discussed briefly. Those  of the United  States are empha-
sized because  these are referenced as a benchmark for changes in Canada.
United States
Many  changes  that  occurred  in  the  U.S.  grain  marketing  system  were  con-
current with  the  Staggers  Rail  Act  (SRA)  of  1980.  The  SRA  introduced  important
regulatory changes in overall rate levels.  Effects on the grain shipping and handling
industry  are  discussed  below along  with,  where  appropriate,  the pre-SRA  institu-
tional environment.
Rate Regulation: Captive  Shippers, Market Dominance and the SRA.  The  SRA  im-
poses  two tests that must  be met before the  ICC  (now the  STB) 1 has jurisdiction to
regulate  rate  levels.  The  first  is a  threshold  level  of revenue  to variable  cost  ratio
(R/VC) 2. Specifically,  if the  R/VC  exceeds  the  threshold,  the  STB  may  have juris-
diction to regulate rates in that movement.
The  shipper is not  necessarily captive  simply  because the R/VC exceeds  the
threshold.  The  second  test  is a  finding of  market dominance in  the  relevant  market.
This  is defined as "an absence of effective  competition from other carriers  or modes
of  transportation  for  the  transportation  to  which  a  rate  applies"  (49  §  U.S.Gc.
10701a[b]  1) (Supp.IV  1980).  It is intended  to be a test or screening device for rate rea-
sonableness.  Guidelines  have  evolved  to  allow  for  evidence  of direct  competition
including inter and intramodal,  as well as two forms of indirect competition,  product
and geographic.  These  are more than administrative  criteria and are evaluated  in the
1These  roles and functions have since been replaced by the Surface Transportation  Board  (STB).
2In 1984  that threshold was  1.80 but it now depends on the extent the railroad is earning an adequate return.
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context  of competitive  markets considering inter and intramodal,  as well as product
and  geographic  effects.  If the  carrier  is found  to  be  market dominant,  the  shippers
could be defined  as "captive"  and then the STB  would have jurisdiction to regulate
the rate.
Rate reasonableness  is evaluated on a case  by case basis. There have been few
cases  in which rate levels have been appealed under these criteria.  Most notable and
relevant here is the McCarthy Farms shipping case3. Briefly, that case has had several
rulings since it was originally filed in  1978. In  1987, the ICC ruled that the Burlington
Northern was dominant in wheat and barley shipments to the Pacific Northwest and
that the  shippers  were  captive.  However,  the  most recent  ruling  (August  14,  1997)
indicated  these  contested  rates  were  not  unreasonable  and  did  not  exceed  the
maximum  reasonable  level.  This  decision  was  based  on  the  constrained  market
approach  and stand alone costing procedures.
Rate Changes Were Liberalized. Prior to  1980,  rate  changes required  90 days  notice
for increases and there were fairly liberal procedures to challenge proposed changes.
The net  effect  of this was that rates were largely very rigid  and changes were intro-
duced  only  infrequently.  Proposed  changes  were  typically  subject  to  a  very  long
notice  about  the  rate  increase.  As  a  result  shippers  had  little  risk  related  to  rate
changes.
The  SRA  changed  the  dynamics  of  rate  changes.  Specifically,  rate  increases
(decreases)  required  a  20(1)  day notice.  The effect  of this was to  allow greater flexi-
bility  for railroads to  respond to market conditions,  but also increased the exposure
to increases in rail rates for shippers.
Contracts.  Contract shipments were an important feature of the service environment
during  the  1980s.  In  addition,  some  evolving  contract  terms  likely influenced  the
pricing and car allocation  practices that subsequently evolved.
Contract rates were widely used in the Untied Sates in the first years following
the  SRA.  The SRA  explicitly  encouraged  carriers  and  shippers  to  enter  into  confi-
dential contracts  for  grain shipments  subject to  informational  disclosure4. Shippers
could  challenge  contract  rates  on  grounds  of  competitive  harm  or  impairment  of
common  carrier  obligation.  In  addition,  the  SRA  allowed  agricultural  shippers  to
challenge  contract rates  on grounds  of the  carrier's refusal  to offer similar  terms to
them  (which  would  constitute  unreasonable  discrimination).  The  legal  process  to
intervene required that the complainant must first prove they would prevail  and that
the dispute cannot be resolved otherwise.
3See Surface Transportation  Board Decision No. 37809,  August  14,  1997:  McCarthy  Farms v. Burlington N.R.R.
4Summary  information  about contract  terms were filed  by the carrier  with the  ICC. This  information  was fairly
general  and  was publicly  disseminated  including  information  about  railroad,  commodity, general  origins and
destinations,  number of cars, type  of movement,  base  tariff rate,  any  special features  and the  minimum annual
volume.
240Prentice and Wilson
Premium Rates for Premium Service. An important  feature  of the SRA was  a clause
to  allow  railroads  to  charge  premium  rates  for  premium  service.  Specifically,
Congress stated  that  "rail  carriers  shall  be  permitted  to  establish tariffs  containing
premium charges for special services of specific levels of services not provided in any
tariff otherwise  applicable  to the movement"  (Section  10734  of Title 49,  United States
Code).  As  a result  of this provision,  railroads  actively  pursued  market-driven  allo-
cation mechanisms,  besides addressing shippers complaints of car availability and to
foster  productively  gains.  This was  important  because  the  clause  facilitated  deve-
lopment of  more  elaborate  guaranteed  forward  shipping  mechanisms  and  service
competition  (see below).
Before the mid 1980s, tariffs did not contain service options or alternatives  for
car  allocation.  Railcar  allocation  was  generally  established  on  a  "first-order-first-
serve"  basis. Uncertainties  in railcar availability and lack of penalties for car cancella-
tions encouraged persistently over ordering and a phenomenon  known as "phantom
orders"  (Wilson,  1989).  The  SRA  facilitated  development  of  this  mechanism  by
allowing (and encouraging)  charging of premium rates for premium services,  and by
allowing a portion of shipments under bilateral contracts. The BN was the innovator
in developing  of these mechanisms which have now been developed by virtually all
of the U.S. Class I railroads.5
Each railroads'  car allocation system has evolved toward a system comprising
multiple  mechanisms.  Generally,  these include  a  mechanism  for allocating  cars  for
general tariff service,  one with a shorter-term guarantee and one with a longer-term
guarantee  and  bilateral  equipment  obligations.  Each  of  these  is  characterized
generally below:
*  General Tariff  allocation  methods have  been  redesigned  to  assure
access  and  to discourage  persistently  over  ordering and  eliminate
the  need  for  shippers  to  be first  in  line.  Carriers  have  taken  two
approaches  to  accomplish  this:  1)  random  selection  and
2) penalizing cancellations.
*  Short-term Guarantee  programs (e.g., COTs, PERX) reward forward
logistical  planning.  Common  features  of  these  programs  include
forward  order  period,  shipper  bidding  process,  transferability,
shipper cancellation  penalties, and carrier performance guarantees.
*  Long-term  Guarantee  programs  promote  greater  efficiency  by
placing the management of private railcar fleets in the hands of rail
carriers. Carriers can expand fleet size while offering logistically dif-
ferentiated  services  to shipping customers.  In addition,  Long-term
Guarantee  programs provide  incentives  to  level shipping  patterns
and  extreme  seasonal  swings  in  grain  movements  (Priewe  and
Wilson,  1997). Shippers receive guaranteed  services, and rail carriers
benefit from more  consistent  shipments.  In  addition,  this program
implies a  risk sharing between  shippers  and carriers  in expanding
5Wilson and Priewe (1997)  provide a comprehensive description of the development  of these mechanisms.
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car fleets and  railcar  efficiency  (cycle  times). Transferability  is also
an  important  element  of  Long-term  Guarantees  since  most  pro-
grams rely on participation from larger grain companies to facilitate
these instruments through secondary markets.
The important  features  of these systems from  a grain shipper perspective  are
that:  1) multiple  mechanisms  are  allowed  for  shippers  to  choose  from;  2) forward
shipping options are offered; and  3) differing  degrees of guarantees are provided by
the carrier.  None of these options were available  before deregulation.  These systems
have already  had very important  implications  for the evolution  of grain  marketing
and the railroad  industry  (see Priewe  and Wilson  (1997)  for  a summary  of implica-
tions of these mechanisms  on grain shippers).
Rail Incentive Mechanisms. The evolution of the rail incentive mechanisms has been
very crucial  to  the changes  that have  occurred  in the  grain handling  and  transpor-
tation industry.  Differentials  implied  in these  mechanisms  reflect  economies  of rail
operations  and  are passed  on as rate  discounts.  In the  process  these  rate discounts
provide incentives  to induce  more efficient grain handling and shipping practices.
The grain rate structure has  evolved to include trainload, single and multiple-
origin rates, and programs  to enhance efficiencies in the total movement-commonly
called origin-destination  efficiency  programs.  Each  of these  are very  important fea-
tures  that  affect  rate  spreads,  providing  differentiation  and  incentives  among  rail
service levels. It is important that these are not necessarily an outgrowth of the SRA,
and  in fact could have  been  and  in  some  cases  were  introduced  prior to the  SRA.
Generally,  these include:  1) origin  efficiency,  or, trainload  rates; 2) origin-destination
efficiency programs;  3) per car  rates; and 4) rates and requirements  for shipments in
higher-cube  (286,000 lb.) covered hopper cars. 6
Effects of Deregulation  on Rail Rates. While  rate  increases  have  been  a  major
concern  for  shippers,  most  of these  have  been  unfounded.  In  fact,  several  studies
have indicated that because of deregulation,  cost savings have accrued and rail rates
have fallen  in real terms. Wilson  (1997,  p.  23)  found that "the effects  of deregulation
on  costs  and productivity  gains  are tremendous  with  costs  in  1989  estimated  to  be
40 percent  lower  under  partial  deregulation  than they would  be  under  a regulated
regime."  In  a related  study focused  on rail  pricing,  Wilson  (1994,  p.  20)  found  that
though  there  were  some  initial  increases  in  rates following  deregulation  (1980),  by
1988  "deregulation produced lower prices in most commodity classifications and did
not increase prices  in other classifications, suggesting that advances  on productivity
have dominated  any adverse market power effects."
6Details  of these  mechanisms, as well  as their evolution  over time  are described  in Wilson  (forthcoming). There
are numerous  forms  of rate  discounts that evolved  in  the U.S.  rail  system.  It is  critical that any comparison  of
rates  over  time,  as  well  as  between  U.S.  and  Canadian  regions  account  for  the  cumulative  effects  of  these
discounts.
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Finally, even in some regions of the United States with relatively less station-
to-station  intramodal  rail competition  rail rates  have  decreased  because of deregu-
lation.  In  particular,  Montana  is a state  in which  rail  rates  are  highly  contested  by
shippers. However,  since deregulation in 1980, the effective rail rate (from Great Falls
to Portland)  has increased  from 71  to 86 U.S. c/bushel. In real terms, this has been an
effective  rate  reduction  of 31  percent.  Another  comparison  is that the  rail  rate  has
declined  by  31  percent,  whereas  the price  of bread  has increased by  15  percent.  No
doubt this  is a highly contested area and a point of reference  for change in Canada,
but it is notable that these rates have declined due to major forces: productivity  gains
and intermarket competition.
Canada
A separate  set of regulations  affects grains for movement within the prairies.
Changes  in the WGTA increased  rail shipping costs paid directly by shippers (previ-
ously,  the  total  cost  was  comparable,  but  a  portion  was  paid  directly  by  the
government of Canada to the railroads).  It is important that the new higher rail rates
(specifically,  that portion paid by the shipper)  are still substantially less than compa-
rable  rates in the  United States.  However,  the legislation  (Canada Transportation  Act,
Division VI  Transportation  of Western Grain) states  specifically that these rates are for
the  movements  of  "any grain  or  crop included  in  Schedule  II  that is  grown in the
Western Division...  (p. 70)  for movements to Thunder Bay or Armstrong...  and speci-
fically  excludes  shipment  to  British  Columbia  ports  for  shipment  to  the
United States."
The  underlying  legislation  provides  the  formula for  rate  determination  and
describes its application.  Specifically,  it establishes a maximum rate scale. These rates
are frozen  to the year  1999 when they become subject to the  CTA conditionally upon
the results of an efficiency review, unless challenged otherwise.
Railcar  allocation  in Canada  is  highly administered  based  on past  shipping
practices.  One important distinction  is between  the allocation of cars for shipment of
Canadian  Wheat Board  (CWB)  grains  versus non-board  commodities. 7,8 CWB  cars
are allocated by the Board to its designated shippers and train runs  (zones are being
implemented)  for the  movements of CWB grains  (Prentice and Campbell, 1998).  The
other portion  is allocated  by the  CAPG  (Car Allocation Policy  Group,  a temporary
mechanism  to replace  a previous regime called the Grain Transportation Authority)
as non-board  allocator, for the  movement  of non-board grains  (i.e.,  for  movements
not controlled  by the  CWB).  Normally,  these  are oats,  canola,  etc.,  but would  also
include  any shipments  of U.S.  grains  to  or through the  Canadian  grain  marketing
system.
7This  system is  under dispute in Canada  and is  under pressure  for change.  For an extensive review of the evo-
lution of car allocation  in the United States, see Priewe and Wilson  (1997).
8This is notwithstanding  the potential implications  of various forms of government-owned  cars  in Canada.
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The regulatory regime  governing rate  levels and service  for grain in Western
Canada  is very different,  than  for other  commodities shipped  by rail in  Canada,  or
for  grains  shipped  in  Eastern  Canada.  For  these  commodities  the  CTA  regulatory
regime is more similar to that in the United States.
FUTURE  ISSUES
As the  agricultural  sectors  in  the NAFTA  countries  become  more  integrated
through  the  respective  bilateral  trade  agreements,  pressure  will increase  for  com-
mercial  and  policy  harmonization  of  the  facilitating  functions.  One  of  the  more
important ones is the transport sector.
Commercially,  the  grains  sector  of North  America  is becoming  harmonized
more rapidly than is the policy environment. The  commercial  integration will likely
be  a  two-stage  process.  First,  firms  will  become  more  integrated  through  asset
ownership.  As this is being done, the next stage will be pressure to standardize  com-
mercial practices across the geographic  region. This is the stage that has yet to evolve.
It  is  interesting  that  the  commercial  integration  is  leading,  even  though  it  would
likely be more ideal if the policy environment was harmonized first. The commercial
sector is leading the way toward  integration which suggests that eventually business
interests will provide added pressure to harmonize the policy differences.
The transport sectors in each  country have evolved  essentially independently
of that in the neighbouring country, but are increasingly being forced to become more
integrated.  As this occurs,  several important issues will emerge.  These are described
below briefly
Rail Service and  Car Allocation Systems
Railcar  service  problems,  which  stem  from  the  underlying  car  allocation
systems,  have  evolved  differently  in  each  country  The  fundamental  problems  are
similar on both sides  of the border,  but the approaches  to  resolve these conflicts  are
distinct.
Many changes  in the grain shipping industry of the United States  evolved  in
response to competitive pressures and to some provisions of the Staggers Railroad  Act
of 1980. Of particular interest has been the evolution of railcar allocation policies, rail
service  strategies  and  problems,  and  the  heightened  importance  of transportation
and logistics management for grain shippers (Gelston and Greene,  1994; Baumel and
Van Der Kamp,  1996) 9. Before  1980, few  changes  occurred  in  railcar allocation.  Rail-
roads  had  always  been  free  to  initiate  service  proposals  under  the  general  tariff
system.  However,  regulatory  procedures  and  rate  bureaus  stifled  such  innovation.
Service proposals were subject to regional rate bureaus consisting primarily of carrier
representatives.
9This  has been  a topic  of growing concern.  See  Becker  (1985),  Harding  (1995)  and Kaufman  (1994)  for  various
views.
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In the late  1980s, the  U.S. railroads began  the development  of alternative  car
allocation  procedures  as  a  cumulative  result  of  competitive  pressures,  shipper
demands  and  some  features  of  the  SRA.  Generally,  the  major  features  of  these
systems  are  1) a multitude  of mechanisms  are offered  shippers;  2) a portion  of each
carriers'  fleet is reserved  for tariff allocation;  3) alternatives are offered  shippers for
forward  and  guaranteed  service;  and  4) risk  sharing  alternatives  between  carriers
and shippers are offered.  During the last decade,  virtually every Class I U.S. railroad
has developed comparable systems encompassing  these features.
These  systems  have  not  been  without  problems.  Indeed  the  initial  systems
were  challenged  in  a  lengthy  legal  battle.  In  addition,  there  are  ongoing  concerns
about the common  carriage obligation under these systems, that some  mechanisms
remove cars from the fleet that would otherwise be available for tariff obligation, and
that even  guaranteed  cars  are sometimes  not placed  (though guaranteed  payments
are made from the carrier to the shipper)  resulting in uncertainty for shippers.
Comparable transition is yet to unfold in Canada, but much of what is at issue
in  the  current  CTA  case  (CWB  vs  CN  and  CP)  relates  to  service  failures  during
1996/97 and trying to define service obligation for shipping CWB grains. In addition,
the Federal Grain Review, under Mr. Justice  Estey,  is scheduled to provide recommen-
dations for change by the end of 1998.
As these systems  unfold and  are adopted,  major issues are  emerging in each
country.  In the United States this relates to the interpretation of common carriage, and
in Canada it has been referred to as service obligations. 10
Operational/Capacity  Limits in the Pacific Ports
An  apparent  evolving  US/Canada  problem  is  that  of  the  likely  ope-
rating/capacity  constraint in Canadian West Coast ports. This has exacerbated  over
time  in response  to changes  in  WGTA  rates,  growth in Asian  economies,  reduced
shipments  to  Russia,  etc.,  and  worsened  due  to  some  operating  practices  at those
ports.  As  these  limits  are  reached,  pressure  increases  to  ship  some  marginal  ship-
ments  through  U.S.  West  Coast ports  (1996/97)  and  U.S.  Gulf.  Indeed  during  the
1996/97  shipping  problems,  Canadian  grain  was  shipped  through  the  U.S.  West
Coast  (though the costs were substantially greater),  and experiment shipments were
made through the U.S. Gulf by barge.
This capacity problem is also being challenged by the differentiated marketing
strategy  being  pursued  by  export  marketers.  It  is becoming  increasingly  apparent
that  the  number  of  segregations  in  the  Canadian  marketing  system  has  been
increasing,  as  has that  in  the  United  States  (but  to a  lesser  extent).  The  effect  of
increased  segregations  on  the  logistics  system  constructed  for  more  homogenous
crops  is  for  reduced  efficiency  and  increased  frequency  of  capacity  constraints
(Prentice,  1998).
10To emphasize, common carriage in  the United States  is alleged not to be meaningful under its current  interpre-
tation (NGFA,  1998).
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Rail Regulatory  Differences
Differences in the underlying regulatory mechanisms governing rail shipping
is an issue  that will  likely become apparent in  the future.  In general,  the U.S. treats
grains the same  as all other commodities  and relies more on market pressures  (intra
and  intermodal,  as well  as product  and intermarket)  to  govern rate  levels.  Service
levels  (being reflected through rail car allocation  systems)  are generally governed by
competitive  pressures,  and  shipper  demands.  In contrast,  railway  freight  rates  for
grain  in  Western  Canada  are  fixed  and  service  is  highly  administered.  Generally,
these  rates  are  at  levels  less  than  those  in  the  United  States,  and  are  highly  rigid
through  time and  with respect to geographic  (distance-based)  and  temporal  consi-
derations.
The effect of these different approaches to regulation ultimately results in eco-
nomic distortions, with pressure to converge,  or, result in further intervention.
Reciprocal Access 11
The establishment  of handling facilities  at U.S.  border points with rail  access
makes  cross-border  shipping  more  efficient  and  attractive.  These  include  the joint
ventures  between  Alberta  Pool  and  General  Mills  at  Sweetgrass  and  the  venture
between Saskatchewan Wheat Pool and General Mills at Northgate. While some have
initially promoted these as primarily for shipment from Canada to the United States,
their strategic  development  has  been  to  develop  and  facilitate  trade  in both  direc-
tions, varying by commodity and depending  on market conditions over time. These
are  likely  natural  logistical  channels  for  shipping  U.S.  feed  grains  into  Western
Canada and potentially for shipping U.S. grains through Canada to export offshore.
A related change  that has potential long-term  implications  is the expansion of
export-handling  capacity  at  Roberts  Bank  in  southern  British  Columbia.  This  is
notable  because  West  Coast handling  capacity  in  Southern  Canada  has  been  con-
strained  which, in fact,  is likely an  important cause for the  escalation  of movements
of Canadian  grain to/through  the  United  States.  This  constraint  has  also generally
limited  the  ability  of  U.S.  grains  moving  to/through  Canada.  In  the  future,  this
expansion  could  provide the needed  capacity  relief necessary  to expand  Canadian
west coast exports.
Differences between the rail shipping systems in the two countries could affect
future trade flows. Though Canadian rail rates have been increased, they are still less
than those  that apply  from similar U.S. shipping points.  These  differences  are parti-
cularly notable in the Northern tier regions or North Dakota and Montana. 12 If every-
thing else is the same with equal access, this difference is important because it should
induce  some  U.S.  grain  to  move  to  or  through the  Canadian  marketing  system.
Through this process,  the potential for cross-border  trade would provide competition
11See Wilson (1998)  for a summary discussion of the motivation  and issues surrounding reciprocal access.
12Fulton and Gray  (1997)  indicated that these differences  are as much as $1/bushel.
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to shipping  regimes  for  U.S. grains.  Currently,  there  is  minimal  movement  of U.S.
grains  to/through  Canada;  however,  in the  future  (with  expansion  of West  Coast
ports and  more direct cross-border  and bilateral  linkages),  the  likelihood/frequency
of U.S. grains moving to/through Canadian  infrastructure will increase.
The  Joint  Commission  indicated  that  a  longer-term  objective  should  be  to
provide reciprocal  access over time  (p. 95).  One vision of the Joint Commission was
that ultimately, pressures will escalate  for greater integration between  the marketing
systems in Canada and the United States. The commercial process toward integration
of these systems  has  escalated,  which,  in the  future,  will add  to  pressures  to  har-
monize  as much as possible  marketing,  and  possibly policy,  mechanisms.  For these
reasons,  the term  reciprocal access was  promoted  as a  concept  for discussion  about
changes to reduce trade frictions. 13
Notwithstanding  the trade  barriers,  reciprocal  access  should be  viewed as  a
longer-term  goal. One interpretation of reciprocal access  is that growers  would have
reciprocal  access  to  certain  features  of each  country's  marketing  mechanisms  and
infrastructure.  In  a  marketplace  with greater  reciprocal  access,  cross-border  trade
may occur  due to differences  in marketing  costs. However,  some important  compe-
titive  functions  of  the  marketing  system  in  each  country  are  denied  cross-border
participants.
As Canadian grain is exported to/through the United States, it has full nondis-
criminatory  access  to  comparable  U.S.  functions.  The  U.S.  handling  and  shipping
system  generally  has  adequate  capacity  and  is  efficient  enough  to  induce  cross-
border shipments.  These are purely commercial and nondiscriminatory with respect
to country of origin.
Potential  benefits  of the  U.S.  marketing  system  include  access  to transport
infrastructure  (rail,  road  infrastructure,  barges  and  port  infrastructure),  elevators,
and risk transfer through  U.S.  futures markets. While these are primarily a result of
commercial relationships and mechanisms, the public sector is involved through pro-
viding  infrastructure,  services,  and a regulatory  framework.  Canadian  shippers are
not treated differently when using the U.S. transportation system and generally have
equal access to its capacity at nondiscriminatory rates. This would not be true for U.S.
shipments through Canada. In addition, allocation of railcars in Canada for shipment
of U.S. grains could affect the viability of trade flows to the extent that there  are dif-
ferences between CWB and non-CWB  grains. This is in contrast to U.S. railroads that
do not distinguish country of origin in allocation of cars, i.e., Canadian shippers have
equal access to U.S. railcars through tariff and contractual allocation mechanisms.
13In trade discussions reported  in January  1998, the United States  suggested a pilot project to allow U.S. grain to
be shipped  to Canadian  elevators.  This is  obviously  an effort toward  effectuating  the possibility  of reciprocal
trade  (Western Producer).
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SUMMARY  AND CONCLUSIONS
The transport of grain  and livestock between  Canada and the  U.S. should be
very  straightforward.  The  infrastructure  is  compatible,  business  operations  are
similar  and  trade  barriers  have  been  falling  under  the  Canada-U.S.  and  North
American  Free  Trade  Agreements.  The  problems  that  affect  the  transportation  of
grain and livestock are subtle in nature and are largely the unintended  result of other
domestic  policy considerations.
Unlike  other sectors  of the  economy,  transportation  services were  essentially
excluded in the negotiations of freer trade in North America.  Pressure to incorporate
the transportation  sector into a comprehensive  free trade agreement was diminished
by the  deregulation  of the transport  that  was  occurring  simultaneously. Although
deregulation  created  a more liberalized environment  for transport,  its shortcomings
now stand out. Inconsistencies in vehicle weights and dimensions and restrictions on
cabotage  activity add to the cost of transborder movements.
Differences  in  trucking  regulations  affect  Canadian  shippers  more  than
American  shippers.  Short  moves  to  local  transborder  markets  can  generally  be
accommodated  from  either  Canada  or the United States.  Longer movements  to  the
southern  half  of  the  United  States  and  Mexico  are  more  difficult.  U.S.  cabotage
restrictions  reduce  the  opportunities  for  Canadian  carriers  to obtain  return  loads.
Consequently  they  are  less  interested  in  serving  these  markets  and/or  demand
freight premiums to offset the risk of an empty return.
The  problem  in rail  transport is also asymmetrical.  Canadian  grain has  open
access  to the U.S. transportation  and handling system on a nondiscriminatory  basis,
while U.S. grain shippers are not given reciprocal  access. U.S. grain can move through
Canada,  but these shipments  are ineligible  for the regulated  freight  rate.  Moreover,
the rail car allocation system in Canada discriminates on a country of origin basis.
The lack  of harmonization  in the transportation  sector has direct and indirect
impacts on the grain and livestock sectors. The direct impact is shipping costs that are
higher  because  the  transport  sector  has  to operate  around  these  regulatory  diffe-
rences.  The indirect impact is the reduction  in competition  in the logistical channels.
Reduced  competition  means  that  service  and/or  rates  for  transportation  are  less
favourable to the grain and livestock  sector than would be the case  in a harmonized
environment.
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